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ABSTRACT 
We take a state-stewardship view on the corporate governance model and executive compensation policies 
in economies with strong political involvement. In such a highly politically-oriented institutional 
environment, the business elites are not just professional managers but are also de facto government officials 
who are directly state-appointed – even in ‘private’ firms. They are expected to act as responsible ‘stewards’ 
of the state. Consequently, their compensation may differ from what agency theory predicts. We test this 
state-stewardship view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity 
value but for increasing the value of the state-owned assets. Managerial compensation depends on political 
connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political and macroeconomic goals and the 
officials’ political achievements. These effects were somewhat weakened since the governance reform of 
2006, when companies became more market-oriented though state influence still prevails. In a social welfare 
perspective, the compensation of state-steward managers stimulates not the maximization of shareholder 
value but the preservation of the state’s interests. 
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A State-Stewardship View on Executive Compensation 
 
1. Introduction 
The executive compensation policies in emerging economies puzzle researchers as the seemingly low 
registered pay and the other-than-performance pay for managers running large internationally active 
corporations located in those economies challenge the standard economic theories on corporate governance.2 
Conyon and He (2011) document that the executive pay (salary and bonus) of US top managers is about 
seventeen times higher than that in China, even after controlling for economic and governance factors. When 
stock options and equity compensation are considered, the difference augments to approximately 42 times. 
The majority of the extant literature on corporate governance resorts to agency theory to explain executive 
compensation policies (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Garen, 1994; Core et al., 1999). The interests of the 
managers (the agent) and shareholders (the principal) can be in conflict, and agency problems may arise if 
managers abuse their power, for instance, by awarding themselves generous pay packages neither justified 
by high managerial skills nor related to a meaningful contribution to the firm’s performance. Consequently, 
the compensation scheme should be designed in such a way as to elicit effort from the management while 
avoiding the above conflicts of interest (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen et al., 2004). However, is this 
agency logic valid for emerging economies? The answer is negative because in countries in political and 
institutional transition such as China, the state and the political authorities own significant equity stakes and 
their political influence extends beyond ownership. The use of non-cash compensation is very rare and, if it 
is used at all, disclosure is incomplete, but perquisite consumption may be more prevalent (Adithipyangkul 
et al., 2011).3 Business activities are heavily influenced by the government and other political powers 
through the government’s deliberate policies on resource allocation, as well as the vast presence of 
government ownership and managers’ political connections. In Russia, for example, politically-connected 
firms represent over 85 percent of the market capitalization (Shleifer, 1998; Faccio, 2006). It is reasonable to 
                                                        
2
 In 2010, Jiangling Motors, one of China’s biggest commercial vehicle companies and Ford’s joint venture partner, 
achieved sales revenues of over $2.5 billion following strong growth. Its CEO, York Chen, received an annual total 
compensation of $375,000, at par with his 2009 pay (but higher than that of any other CEO in this sector). In marked 
contrast, Dieters Zetsche, the CEO of the European automobile giant Daimler AG, earned €8.7 million euro ($12 
million), twice his pay in 2009 and more than 30 times Chen’s salary. This discrepancy in pay is even larger when one 
considers Ford ’s CEO Allan Mulally, who received $26.5 million in 2010, 48% more than in 2009 (Bloomberg, April 1, 
2011). 
3
 Stock options were rarely used before 2008, and even subsequently, merely 5% of listed companies report the use of 
stock options to remunerate their managers.  
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believe that such strong political influence on business activities results in relatively less market-based 
managerial compensation schemes.  
Several papers have examined executive compensation in emerging economies, in particular, China (e.g. 
Firth et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010; Conyon and He, 2011; Chen et al., 2011), but their focus was mainly on 
testing western corporate governance theories, such as pay-for-performance sensitivity or managerial power 
theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002), in the Chinese context. 
Unsurprisingly, the validity of the agency theory in the Chinese corporate world is weak. An alternative 
theoretical framework incorporating the broader political and institutional determinants of China’s corporate 
governance system is needed (Buck et al., 2007; van Essen et al., 2012a). It is also important to take an 
institutional perspective as significant shifts of state powers in the economy and businesses have arisen over 
the last decade. Therefore, in the context of compensation contracting in China, two main research questions 
emerge: (1) What roles (other than ‘agents’) do managers play and how are they remunerated? (2) How do 
such roles and compensation evolve over time?  
In this paper, we find that the level and structure of Chinese executive compensation does not tie in 
with the principal-agent’s predications on pay-for-performance. The low compensation of Chinese managers 
(relative to their international peers) is prevalent in firms with stronger state control, and when self-dealing 
opportunities are larger. Managers are also rewarded more for maximizing the value of state-owned assets 
(rather than for maximizing shareholder value). Furthermore, their compensation is not closely linked to 
ability, but to their political connections and prestige, as well as to their firms’ contribution to the local 
officials’ political goals. All these effects have evolved over time, whereby especially the major privatization 
effort of 2006 (the split-share structure reform) has had a big impact on the roles of managers and their 
compensation contracts. Some of these findings were also documented in other studies, most recently in Cao 
et al. (2011), although they have not housed them in a consistent theoretical framework. In our analysis, we 
take a state-stewardship view to explain these unique governance and compensation contracting patterns. For 
a clear understanding of some key concepts, we make the following two definitional distinctions. First, the 
“state” is not necessarily the “nation”: the former refers in the context of this paper to the interest of the 
ruling political elites, while the latter represents the interest of the public masses (citizens). Therefore, by 
calling Chinese managers the state’s stewards we mean that their interests are in line with those of the 
politicians, but not necessarily with the public interest. Second, “state-stewardship” is different from 
“stewardship”: the former describes a state-manager relationship that is institutionalized by coercive or 
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normative political forces (the manager can still be self-interested), while the latter describes a 
pro-organizational behavior based on human altruism assumptions. A comparison between the traditional 
principal-agent perspective and our state-stewardship perspective is offered in Table 1, and will be further 
illustrated in the following sections. 
[Table 1] 
Our work makes the following contributions. First, as the traditional agency theory is not able to 
explain the level, composition, and evolution of executive compensation in China (e.g., Firth et al., 2006, 
2007; Conyon and He, 2011), we focus on state influence and managers’ political connections from a 
state-stewardship view on Chinese corporations. This institutional perspective has stronger explanatory 
power as it incorporates the organizing principle, incentive structures, and enforcement mechanisms of firms 
and managers within China’s authoritarian political system after the economic reform and incomplete 
privatization. Second, we take an institutional perspective with a focus on institutional change to study how 
the Chinese state controls the economy - by means of ownership stakes and political connections with the 
2006 split-share reform as a watershed. Such institutional change also implies a shift of wealth from the state 
(the government) to the nation (the private citizens), while the authoritarian state still maintains tight control 
over (corporate) employees (Xu, 2011). Third, the state-manager relationship has broader implications for 
China’s economic and political development. Economic reform without reforming the human resources 
policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision 
making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives. Therefore, this 
study also has some welfare implications. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1. Privatization and the split-share structure reform 
When China started its economic reform in 1978, one of the key elements was the privatization (or 
‘corporatization’ (Clarke, 2003)) of the formerly state-owned enterprises. Two stock exchanges, in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen, were established in 1990. Listed companies became increasingly accountable to shareholders 
(in addition to the state). The managerial resource allocation system has been improved since the modern 
industrial and corporate reforms were initiated in 1978 and continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
  4
(Groves et al., 1994, 1995). Initially, a dual share structure was established for all listed companies: 
approximately two-thirds of domestically listed shares (A-shares) were not tradable on the market and were 
usually owned by the government and state agencies, which hindered the privatization process considerably. 
In April 2005 (effective from 2006), the Chinese government initiated the split-share structure reform of 
turning non-tradable shares into tradable ones (called the share issue privatization (SIP)) for all listed 
domestic firms. More than 1,400 listed companies could ‘gradually’ convert their tradable shares4. Holders 
of non-tradable shares5 negotiated and compensated holders of tradable shares in each individual firm by 
giving them about three shares for every 10 shares on average so as to make the non-tradable shares tradable 
through negotiated compensation plans which differed from firm to firm. All Chinese listed companies 
completed their negotiations by the end of 2008, and all of their restricted shares became fully tradable by 
the end of 2011. Even after the split-share structural reform, the state is still playing a major role in 
regulating companies’ strategic-decision making, developing corporate governance regulation, and setting 
executive compensation schemes through retaining the executive-level employees as state-appointees, 
maintaining a stake in privatized firms, and supervising firms via the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). In many firms, especially those within the electronics, automobile manufacturing, 
steel, natural resource exploitation and extraction industries, the state has kept majority control while foreign 
share stakes are restricted. The managers, the board’s chairperson, the political secretary of the firm (the 
Communist Party representative), and other managers are usually directly appointed by the state, and their 
compensation contracts are directly determined by the Organization Department of the Communist Party and 
the State Council, rather than by the board of directors. As a consequence, corporate governance and 
executive compensation contracting in China’s state-oriented economy exhibit unique patterns not present in 
Western economies. The change of state ownership over our sample period for different industries is 
exhibited in Figure 1. Figure 1a shows the evolution of the state ownership in the top five industries ranked 
by market capitalization. Figure 1b depicts the industry-average state ownership of all industries included in 
our sample. The split-share reform is visible from 2005 to 2006; the decline of state ownership has continued 
in all subsequent years. 
[Figures 1a-1b] 
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 In fact, the change of ownership was much more radical. By the end of 2007, 1,254 firms representing over 97% of 
the Chinese A-share market capitalization at the time had completed the reform. 
5
 These are usually the state (including the central or local governments and their affiliates, such as state asset 
management companies and SOEs) and legal persons (typically domestic business agencies or enterprises of local 
government that helped establish the listed firms) (Sun and Tong, 2003). Holders of these non-tradable shares were 
entitled to the same voting and cash flow rights as holders of tradable shares (Li,Wang, Cheung, Jiang, 2011). 
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2.2. Corporate governance structure and executive compensation structure 
China’s corporate governance structure has been set up since the privatization in the early 1990s6 and 
is based on western governance codes and corporate law, although China’s Socialist-featured company law 
and related codes (in particular, the CSRC Codes) comprise some singularities. For instance, the Chinese 
corporate board structure combines some aspects of the Anglo-American one-tier board model and the 
German two-tier one7. In principle, it is loosely based on the two-tier structure, but in practice more like a 
muddled one-tier Anglo-American board (IIF 2006) whereby the board8 (i) consists of several independent 
directors (CSRC requires the independent director ratio of the board to be above one third), (ii) is the main 
decision-making authority within the firm, and (iii) oversees and aids management practice. In practice, the 
Chinese supervisory board has only a symbolic function and hence does not play an effective governance 
role (Tam, 2002; Tenev and Zhang, 2002). Since the bureaucrats (e.g. the party committee) are in charge of 
the company nominate and remove directors and supervisors alike, the supervisory board members have 
little say in the major corporate decisions. 
In SOEs9 which still account for over 80% of market capitalization in China, the dominant shareholder 
is the state, and their boards of directors usually consist of members directly appointed by the central or local 
government to serve on e.g. the strategy committee (which makes the strategic investment and development 
decisions) or the compensation committee. At the same level with the board of directors are a supervisory 
board and a representative Party committee led by the Party Secretary who vouches for the ideological 
influence over the board and the entire firm.10 It is clear that this board(s) structure(s) can lead to confusion 
and induce some ambiguity about the board member duties (Financial Times, April 2, 2008). The 
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 The de facto privatization has been underway since mid-1980s under the name of ‘shareholding system reform’ (in 
Chinese, gufenzhi gaige). 
7
 In general, executive directors and non-executive directors of US and UK firms man one organizational body which 
is chaired by the CEO (as is frequently the case in the US) or not (in the UK). Such one-tier boards also comprise audit, 
remuneration, and nomination committees. In contrast, firms from German legal origin countries such as Austria, 
Germany, and Japan, separate the executive and supervisory boards (the latter then only consists of non-executive 
directors with advisory and monitoring roles who represent shareholders and employees).  
8
 Henceforth, when we mention the ‘board’, we refer to the board of directors consisting of both executive and 
non-executive directors, but not the supervisory board. 
9
 There are two types of SOEs. Most SOEs are directly (or ultimately) controlled by the central government under 
China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council, and enjoy 
monopoly power in certain industries such as energy and telecommunication. Other SOEs are controlled by local 
government under the local SASAC.  
10
 The main difference and connections between the supervisory board and the party committee is that the supervisory 
board is usually chaired by an employee representative from the All China Federation of Trade Unions (China’s only 
government-sanctioned union), and among the other board members is typically an official from the company’s internal 
party committee and at least one other person elected by shareholders. Company directors and other senior managers 
are not allowed to sit on the board of supervisors. 
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counterpart of the Western CEO of a Chinese SOE is usually called ‘general manager’ who does not own 
shares of the company. In many cases, especially in large SOEs, the functions of general manager (CEO) 
and chairperson of the board are combined by one person, a phenomenon which is usually termed as 
managerial duality. Figure 2 illustrates the unique internal governance structure of Chinese companies 
(especially of SOEs).  
[Figure 2] 
Under such special corporate governance arrangements, executive compensation schemes in SOEs have 
been based on the highly structured civil service pay scale which mainly reflects the differences in region, 
industry, and seniority. Even in private firms which account for less than 20% market capitalization, the 
influence of the state is still salient, usually through government policies and politically-connected 
executives (Economist, September 3, 2011). Moreover, the communist tenets advocating similarity in pay 
across all ranks of members of society also put regulatory ceilings on their registered compensation 
(including cash salaries and bonuses)11. In addition, stock options and equity-based pay are very rare in 
Chinese companies. Despite these caps, managers are often compensated by perquisites such as free housing 
and gray income which is not recorded on the balance sheets, and bribery and self-dealing are not 
exceptional (Adithipyangkul et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2010).  
3. A State-stewardship View on China 
Since the ground-breaking work by Donaldson and Davis (1991), scholars have resorted to the 
stewardship theory of management as a basis for managers’ and shareholders’ philosophical alignment. This 
theory, a sociological and psychological approach to governance, hinges on the assumption that executives 
feel a strong sense of attachment to and psychological ownership of their firm, and hence are more likely to 
behave as stewards. This perspective stands in marked contrast with agency theory in which managers are 
assumed to act in their own interest at the expense of shareholders. Higher levels of ‘psychic income’ 
(Gimeno et al., 1997) should make ‘organizationally centered’ executives (Davis et al., 1997: 25) accept 
lower cash compensation to continue working in the organization. We adapt this stewardship concept to the 
Chinese context, and use this term to describe the fact that Chinese managers are in principle (required to be) 
accountable to the state. Chinese managers are usually appointed by the state, and maintain close political 
connections with the government. As a result they actually act like the stewards of the state, and work 
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 Under government regulations, the executive compensation can only be up to 10-12 times that of an average worker. 
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towards fulfilling both the economic objectives of the firm and the political ones of the state. Different from 
the stewardship theory which makes a human managerial altruism assumption on the manager, our 
perspective admits that Chinese managers can still be self-interested. However, the institutionalization of 
state-stewardship ensures that acting in the interest of the state is also in managers’ own interest. We 
illustrate the formation and institutionalization of state-stewardship from three angles: (a) the organizing 
principles of the company, (b) the incentive structures of the manager, and (c) the enforcement mechanisms 
imposed by the state.  
In terms of the organizing principle, the state is involved in every level of activity of the firm, both at 
the political and economic one. The political organizing principle requires that firms’ business activities be 
fundamentally state-driven, be aligned with goals such as safeguarding the political power/social demand, 
and be conform with the ideological requirements. The economic organizing principle requires that firms’ 
business activities achieve economic growth in state-related sectors’ and maintain some degree of monopoly 
power in some ‘national strategic industries’.  
The incentive structures for state-appointed (or state-influenced) managers are based on a political 
cadre promotion system with different hierarchical levels. Each level of the cadre is equipped with a 
different set of benefits, but by nature, all are entitled as government officers to enjoy miscellaneous 
political and economic types of rewards. For instance, under the career promotion system, a manager who 
wants to secure his job and ensure promotion has to show loyalty to the party. 
The enforcement mechanisms rely on the coercive power of the state to punish the stewards when they 
violate the state’s will or when their behavior and performance are perceived as unsatisfactory. The 
punishment comprises lowering a SOE manager’s rank (seniority) in the civil service hierarchy or removing 
a manager from his political cadre position. Moreover, the government regularly rotates its officers and 
state-appointed managers between political and corporate positions to make sure that they are absolutely 
loyal to the government (the party). 
This state-stewardship concept is not static but has evolved over the past two decades. The massive 
privatization has reformed the ownership of Chinese enterprises, transiting from entirely state-owned to 
semi-state owned or privately owned, especially after the split-share structure reform. Correspondingly, the 
form of control by the Communist-Party-led state has transited from pure state ownership to 
state-stewardship. We argue that the reforms only privatized the ownership structure and composition but 
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did not really reform the human resources policies at the managerial level. To maintain its control legitimacy, 
the state boosts the economy through privatization (which leads to more efficient allocation of resources and 
improves production efficiency), and controls the economy through maintaining its stewardship system 
within firms to carry out its political objectives. Table 2 shows a comparison between these two major types 
of control exerted by China’s state, in terms of their representative periods, control methods, governance 
models, and managerial incentive structures. 
[Table 2] 
Within this state-stewardship framework, we revisit the executive compensation issues at three levels: 
the personal-level (managerial background), the firm-level (ownership, performance, and internal 
governance mechanisms), and the macroeconomic level, that have been investigated in the literature from 
the agency perspective. To do so, we develop five testable hypotheses and contrast them with agency 
predictions in the next section. 
4. Hypotheses 
4.1. State control, gray income, and executive compensation 
Our first set of hypotheses explores this question: What drives the managerial compensation in China? 
(Or why is Chinese compensation so low?) We have seen above that the state puts more emphasis on 
political and macroeconomic objectives rather than on firm profitability. Consequently, a manager’s 
incentive structure may be geared towards the former objectives. As state’s stewards, government-appointed 
managers are government officials who face the threat of punishment for lack of political loyalty (dismissal) 
but are also offered lower firm-based pecuniary rewards, and lower pay-for-corporate performance. In 
addition, they are subject to regulatory salary ceilings (e.g. salary grades and brackets based on rank). The 
prevailing presence of state ownership and state control in Chinese firms is the legacy of China’s incomplete 
privatization, which can be viewed as exogenous from a corporate perspective. Especially for the largest 
companies and companies in key industries of ‘national strategic importance’ such as oil and 
telecommunication, the state wants to retain its absolute control (‘retain the large’). More concentrated state 
ownership is usually associated with various non-pecuniary benefits for the management such as higher 
prestige, stronger political cadre promotion incentives, but also with stronger (coercive) state influence, and 
a stronger concern for public criticism (Kuhnen and Niessen, 2012) – a reason for setting regulatory salary 
ceilings. 
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Agency theory predicts a negative relationship between institutional ownership concentration and 
executive compensation, because the major shareholders adopt a monitoring role in mitigating the agency 
problems between shareholders and managers and are expected to avoid excess managerial compensation 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003). However, a positive relation is expected in an environment that lacks effective 
incentives and monitoring mechanisms due to managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). It is 
widely believed that even though the ownership is concentrated in Chinese firms, the fact that the controlling 
shareholder is the state results in little effective monitoring (IIF 2006). In our state-stewardship view, the 
institutionalized state-manager relationship (“state-stewardship”) makes managers accept lower 
compensation in companies in which the state retains control. Therefore, we hypothesize that a higher 
proportion of shares owned by the state results in less cash compensation as there is then a higher probability 
that the pay schedules for civil servants or political representatives will be applied and higher non-monetary 
rewards can be enjoyed (subsidized housing, better health insurance). If this hypothesis is true, we will 
expect a negative association between the state ownership stakes (whereby the state can be a direct or 
ultimate owner), and managerial pay: 
H1a. Managerial compensation is lower in firms with stronger state ownership, and in firms whose 
ultimate controller is the state. The effect of state ownership has become less important since the 2006 
reform. 
In this state-stewardship framework, besides receiving non-pecuniary benefits, executives in Chinese 
companies with stronger state ownership may also stealthily compensate their low pay packages by means of 
gray income through colluding with politicians and state agencies (Wang and Xiao, 2011). Gray income 
(unlike perquisite consumptions which are legal) resulting from ‘tunneling’ is prevalent among firms in 
developing countries with strong state influence such as Russia (Johnson et al., 2000) and China (Jiang et al., 
2010). For example, the latter study documents that during the period 1996-2006, the management siphoned 
tens of billions of RMB from listed firms by means of inter-corporate loans to blockholders. Information on 
such inter-corporate loans is publically available but the loans do not require a ‘fair value’ test. Furthermore, 
these loans were not made as part of the firms’ normal course of business, they did not even accrue interest, 
and even when some interest was accrued, neither the interest nor the principal were typically ever paid back. 
It is fair to expect that managers of the firms where this type of tunneling was rampant, personally benefited 
by colluding with dominant shareholders (often even state authorities or agencies) and sharing the private 
benefits the blockholders have extracted from the firm. Jiang et al. (2010) argue that China is an 
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environment highly conducive to tunneling behavior.12 They also show that this practice was not uncommon, 
and more so in local-government controlled firms than for firms controlled by the central-government. 
Inter-corporate loans were booked as ‘other receivables’ on the balance sheet. The lack of clout of the 
market regulators caused the tunneling practices to persist in spite of the security regulations issued between 
2001 and 2006. In 2006, eight government ministries threatened public disclosure and personal action 
against top management to stop the abuse.  
Agency theory which assumes a conflict of interest between shareholders and the managers would 
predict – in contrast to the state-stewardship framework - a positive relationship between managerial 
compensation and tunneling by controlling shareholders (Noe, 2009). This is because, in order to benefit 
from tunneling, controlling shareholders would “bribe” the manager by offering him higher compensation. 
The split-share reform has been shown in the literature to enhance governance and curb controlling 
shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders. In contrast, from our viewpoint, managers are the 
state’s stewards, they collude with shareholders who are usually government authorities stealing from the 
public. We therefore expect a negative correlation between managers’ contractual compensation and the size 
of the other receivables on the balance sheet because managers with low income may be more prone to 
resort to tunneling and managers who significantly increase income through tunneling care less about their 
(low) cash compensation. After the 2006 split-share reform, non-tradable shares became tradable on the 
stock markets and ownership became more dispersed. Consequently, the use of tunneling by managers and 
major shareholders to extract private benefits from minority shareholders (public investors) has been 
reduced so that such gray income opportunities may have become smaller. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1b. Managerial compensation in China is lower in firms with higher other receivables. The 
opportunities to complement pay by means of tunneling (through other receivables) have decreased since 
the 2006 reform. 
4.2. Value maximization: agents vs. state’s stewards 
Our second hypothesis examines whom Chinese managers are responsible to. State control may 
decrease managerial pay but may also insulate managers who are inefficient (from a corporate perspective) 
(Conyon and He, 2011) but still adhere to the political objectives of the state. From an agency perspective, 
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 Jiang et al. (2010) give the following reasons: (i) all Chinese listed firms have a dominant/controlling 
shareholder; (ii) prior to 2006, the trading of controlling shares was restricted, thus limiting the ownership benefits of 
price appreciation to the controlling shareholder, and increasing her incentive to obtain benefits through other channels; 
(iii) the legal system offers few options for minority shareholders to take private enforcement action against 
blockholder misconduct; (iv) public enforcement, including fines and prison terms for tunneling, has been hampered by 
the limited authority of security market regulators.  
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managerial pay should be linked to performance that maximizes shareholder value, whereas from a 
state-stewardship view, a manager is motivated less by pecuniary rewards but more so by political objectives, 
which translates into political promotions and prestige. To measure performance, we use the return on assets 
(ROA) which measures the net income to the assets (still to a large extent) controlled by the state, and 
Tobin’s Q, which captures the market-based return to the shareholder’s equity. If there is indeed a 
discrepancy between being responsible to the state and not to the shareholders, we would observe that 
managerial compensation is more related to the ROA but less to Tobin’s Q (Van Essen et al., 2012b). Since 
the split-share structure reform of 2006 when most non-tradable shares were sold to the market as tradable 
equity and corporate governance became more market-oriented, we expect that the increase in 
market-orientation is reflected in the stronger pay for market-based performance. Therefore, 
H2. The managerial compensation in China is significantly positively correlated with the return on 
assets, but not with the market-based return (e.g. Tobin’s Q) in the pre-2006 period. Subsequently, we 
expect that the former relation is attenuated and that pay is significantly positively related to the 
market-based return. 
4.3. Political connections and managerial backgrounds 
If corporate performance in China is a less important benchmark for managerial pay, what are the main 
corporate characteristics and managerial traits that are related to higher compensation? Let us first examine 
whether pay is related to a manager’s personality, ability, and political-connections. If the state-stewardship 
concept is valid, we expect managers not to be rewarded for their real abilities to generate financial returns, 
but to their connectedness to the state and the politicians, and to their degree of compliance to the state order. 
China is notable for being an environment where friendly connections with government officials can pave 
the way through the bureaucratic labyrinth (Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2011), even easing access to 
capital that is scarce for pure private-sector enterprises (Fan et al., 2007). Furthermore, a political 
background increases one’s prestige in China substantially. Managers of listed firms who are politically 
connected are perceived to belong to both the business and political elites which reflects their high status in 
the social hierarchy of the Chinese society (Li and Zhang, 2007). Therefore, one could hypothesize that 
managers are paid in line with this hierarchical status. As the direct ownership stakes held by the state have 
decreased since the (partial) privatization, the importance of state control through political connections has 
increased, which may be reflected in higher pay for connectedness (especially since 2006) but not 
necessarily for ability. 
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In contrast, agency theory implies that politically connected managers are paid more only if their 
connections are beneficial to the firms, e.g., in easing financial constraints and securing large contracts, 
because they increase shareholder value. However, it has been well documented that executives’ political 
connections actually lead to worse financial performance due to politicians’ rent extraction from companies 
they manage, especially in developing countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Faccio et al., 2006). Therefore, 
under the agency framework, the board of directors should not allot higher compensation to politically 
connected managers, while under the state-stewardship framework such managers will be paid more by the 
state. 
H3a. Politically connected managers receive higher compensation. This relation is stronger in the 
post-2006 period. 
Under the rule of the communism tenets, the state and its stewards may window-dress their relationship 
in order to avoid public criticism. They may appease the public by setting relatively higher compensation for 
some easily observable managerial traits, such as degrees from prestigious universities or academic 
scholarship. These factors significantly contribute to one’s prestige in China which has a long history and 
tradition (Confucianism) of respecting knowledge and intellectuals. Moreover, in the light of China’s 
lagging intellectual and educational development in modern history (the past 60 years), Chinese hold people 
who have been educated at foreign top universities or have worked overseas in high esteem. Whereas agency 
theory states that managerial pay ought to be closely linked to a manager’s abilities, under our 
state-stewardship view managers’ actual abilities to efficiently manage their firms are expected to be less 
important in terms of compensation (Rose and Shepard, 1997; Graham et al., 2012). Obviously, academic 
and international experience is not just a factor of prestige, it may also increase Chinese executives’ abilities 
to manage state assets and generate more benefits for the state in their function as responsible stewards. We 
distinguish between prestige and ability variables by also testing whether experience in specialized fields 
(technology, finance, and accounting) is priced in the manager’s compensation.  
We classify the managerial characteristics according to three dimensions: the prestige, ability, and 
personal dimensions in order to explore which types of characteristics account for higher compensation. 
Prestige increases for managers with Political Experience, with International Work Experience, with 
Overseas Education, with Academic Experience, with a higher Educational Degree. Ability is captured by 
Accounting Experience, Financial Experience, and Technological Experience. The personal dimension is 
determined by Gender, Nationality, and Age (which may also proxy for seniority and entrenchment within 
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the firm). Based on our above discussion, we expect that managerial pay significantly positively correlates 
with a manager’s political and prestige dimensions, but less so to ability and personal characteristics. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3b. Managerial compensation is significantly positively related to the manager’s ‘prestige’, 
mirrored by international work experience, overseas education, or academic background, but less related 
to the manager’s ‘ability’, reflected by their work experience in specialized industries. 
4.4. The role of internal corporate governance and symbolic management 
Our fourth set of hypotheses is on the internal corporate governance mechanisms (mainly the structure 
of the board) that could regulate managerial compensation. An effective board structure could alleviate 
moral hazard problems and reduce agency costs (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). The effectiveness of the 
board structure (especially in monitoring managers) should be stronger when firms become more 
market-oriented, and executive compensation could consequently be driven more towards the Western 
pay-for-performance model.  
Based on our state-stewardship view that managers and the state share the same interests which may 
conflict with that of the citizens, we question the effectiveness of board structures in relation to regulating 
managerial compensation in China. The state has little incentive to implement a real corporate governance 
reform leading to more independence from the state. Some studies suggest that as China’s corporate 
governance gradually converges to the Western market-based model, especially since the issuance of the 
2002 CSRC Code which requires the presence of more independent directors and the separation of 
management and supervision. Since then, board structure should play a stronger role in aligning managerial 
pay to firm performance (e.g. Conyon and He, 2011; Cao et al., 2011). However, the blending of the 
Anglo-Saxon model and the German model of corporate governance actually dilutes the effectiveness of the 
independent directors and the supervisory board, and board committees, and duplicates administrative costs. 
Furthermore, as is the case with the nomination of managers, directors are also usually selected by the 
government and many of them have political connections. In this sense, they are also stewards of the state, 
and share the same interests as (‘collude’ with) the managers instead of monitoring them. Therefore, 
externally visible structures (such as committees, procedures, and formal organizational positions) are 
mainly used to meet legal requirements or social procedures in China, rather than to reform corporate 
governance in substance (Markoczy et al., 2013). This practice, often coined as “symbolic management” is 
used to conform to societal rules, norms, and expectations but not to the essence of the regulation (Westphal 
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and Graebner, 2010; Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 1998). For example, Peng (2004) has confirmed that 
appointing outside directors to board positions in Chinese firms often serves a symbolic purpose without 
actually improving corporate governance. IIF (2006) also reports that independent directors have little 
leeway to influence corporate strategy in China. Also, the setting up of compensation committees is 
voluntary under the recommendation of CSRC in 1999, and can also be used as a symbolic management tool 
in China, which Markoczy et al. (2013) confirm.  
In this light, the symbolic management view can be housed in our state-stewardship perspective that 
explains executive compensation in Chinese firms. As the state’s stewards, the boards do not function to 
effectively monitor managers and constrain managerial pay, and many of the board structures (such as the 
ratio of independent directors and the existence of compensation committees) are merely symbolic – they are 
either not related to or even positively related to pay. In addition, they would not induce stronger 
pay-for-performance (Van Essen et al., 2012a). In contrast, agency theory predicts that well functioning 
internal corporate governance mechanisms should be related to lower managerial pay and stronger 
pay-for-performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). For the Chinese context however, we hypothesize that: 
H4a. Managerial compensation is not related or even positively related to symbolic features of board 
structures such as the ratio of independent directors and the setting up of a compensation committee. 
These board structures do not strengthen pay-for-performance. 
Another important internal governance feature is the phenomenon of managerial duality. Managerial 
duality whereby the manager is also the chairman of the board, and in some cases, even the secretary of the 
party committee, is still prevalent in Chinese corporations13. In an agency framework, managerial duality 
creates conflicts of interests as the manager is put in a position where he has to evaluate and monitor his own 
performance.14 The managerial power theory within the agency framework states that duality gives the 
manager more power over the board, and that top management is likely to abuse their power by rewarding 
themselves a high compensation (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). However, given that most 
managers who hold dual positions in China usually also have significant political stakes and aligned interests 
with the state as its stewards, it is not likely that they would put their own political fate at risk. Since the 
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 A good example of this managerial duality is the General Manager of PetroChina Jiang Jiemin, who served as the 
Deputy Provincial Governor of the Qinghai Province and the deputy secretary of the province during 2000-2003. He 
has been the General Manager of CNPC, the chairman, the president and the party secretary of PetroChina all at the 
same time, and he is also an alternate member of the 17th CPC Central Committee. However, Jiang’s compensation 
was not high: according to Reuters, Jiang’s 2010 compensation was only RMB 916,000 (approximately $140,000).  
14
 For example, Core, et al. (1999) provide empirical evidence that managerial duality is associated with significantly 
higher managerial compensation.  
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2006 reform, the state has significantly decreased its ownership stakes but has shifted control towards 
dominating the recruitment/hiring policies of executive employees. The state relies more on appointing 
(re)liable managers and such liability becomes particularly important when the manager holds a duality 
position. Therefore, while the agency view predicts a positive relation between managerial pay and 
managerial duality over our whole sample period, the state-stewardship perspective predicts that managerial 
duality be more positively related to managerial compensation in the post-2006 period. We hypothesize that: 
H4b. Managerial compensation in China is weakly positively related to managerial duality in the 
pre-2006 period, but is more significantly positively related to managerial duality in the post-2006 period. 
4.5. Local and national political goals 
Whereas the above mentioned political dimension is based on issues beyond the individual and firm 
level, our final hypothesis deals with the macroeconomic determinants of managerial compensation. The 
organizing principles of the state require that firms’ business activities should be fundamentally state-driven, 
and be conform with the ideological requirements. Macroeconomic performance at the regional level is an 
important political indicator of how well local politicians are doing in terms of reaching the political goals of 
the state and the government(s). Following this logic, we argue from our state-stewardship view that 
managerial compensation also reflects those political goals (in Chinese: Zheng Ji). We focus on three major 
political/economic goals that the Chinese government cares about most: GDP growth, employment, and 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI). More precisely, as the executives in the local state-controlled firms 
are usually selected by the local provincial officers who control huge amounts of resources and enjoy broad 
autonomies (Xu, 2011), or have closer connections and aligned interests with the local government, their 
compensation should be positively correlated with the local provincial GDP growth and employment. To test 
the link between managerial compensation and macroeconomic factors, we use gross domestic product 
(GDP), total employment of the local province where the firm is headquartered, and the number of 
employees hired by the firm, as measures of how the managers as state’s stewards fulfill the local governors’ 
political aims. Prior to 2006, inward FDI (attracting foreign capital and obtaining technological knowhow) 
was emphasized in the national economic strategy. Subsequently, GDP growth was stressed, also as a 
consequence of the global economic crisis. It should be noted that the political priorities differ across regions, 
for instance, the eastern coastal provinces with their high level of economic development versus the inner 
continental provinces (northern and western regions). The more developed regions have been the engines of 
China’s economic growth, and there the local governors’ priorities hinge on GDP growth, whereas in less 
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developed regions, attracting foreign direct investment to upgrade the industrial structure is the focus. The 
agency theory would make no such prediction as there are no mechanical linkage between managerial pay 
and macroeconomic factors after controlling for provincial macroeconomic effects which capture those 
unobserved macroeconomic factors such as local income, local property prices, labor market prosperity, 
social safety net, as well as other geographical and demographical factors. Although the values of some 
macroeconomic variables vary over time, their relative cross-province differences are stable and can be 
controlled through province fixed effects. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H5. Managerial compensation is positively related to the local macroeconomic (political) 
achievement indicators such as growth in GDP, inward FDI, and corporate employment. 
 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
5.1. Data 
We test our hypotheses on firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges15. We collect our data 
from the Wind Database, CSMAR, and Peking University’s China Center for Economic Research (CCER) 
database, which comprise all A-share companies16 listed on the above exchanges since 1990. Financial and 
operational data, along with information about industry classification, location of headquarters (city and 
province) are collected from Wind. Information on executive compensation, stock ownership, corporate 
governance, and board structure are gathered from CSMAR, and information on the ultimate shareholders’ 
names is from CCER. In addition, we manually collected the variables capturing CEOs’ characteristics and 
backgrounds from their curricula published on Wind and CSMAR. To supplement the managerial 
background data, we collect the profiles from the annual reports, more specifically from the ‘Profile of 
Directors and Senior Managers’ sections that comprise the manager’s name, gender, education, academic 
and professional background, and career history. The dataset consists of 17,272 firm-year observations 
covering more than 92% of all listed firms in mainland China over the period 2001 to 2011. We excluded the 
financial and insurance companies, and the firms labeled by the stock exchanges as Special Treatment (ST). 
The latter are firms in financial distress or experiencing financial difficulties (e.g. negative net earnings for 
two consecutive years) as defined by CSRC. We follow the Industry Classification Guide of Listed 
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 We exclude Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong or abroad as they operate in a different institutional environment and 
are subject to different regulations. 
16
 A-shares are stocks valued in RMB and available only to Chinese citizens; B-shares are also denominated in RMB 
but traded in such foreign currencies (USD or Hong Kong dollar). 
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Companies issued by CSRC in April 2001 to partition our sample firms into 21 industries. Table 3 
summarizes the variable definitions, and Table 4 exhibits the summary statistics on the main variables17. 
[Tables 3 and 4] 
Firms could manipulate their financial and compensation information, e.g. the gray income accrued to 
executives. However, the number of falsified financial statements in China appears to be fairly limited; Firth 
el al. (2011) find that only 271 firms have the restatements during 2000–2005 (3.7% of all observations). In 
addition, as aforementioned, equity-based pay such as stock options are rare in China, even in recent years. 
These help justify the reliability of using cash compensation (salaries and bonuses) as the proxy for 
managerial pay. 
5.2. Methodology 
We estimate the determinants of managerial pay using fixed effects models as the Hausman tests 
indicates that the covariates are not uncorrelated with the unobserved firm effects. As some of key 
independent variables are time-invariant (e.g. managers’ personal background), we also estimate random 
effect models. The dependent variable is top managerial pay, which is defined as the logarithm of the total 
compensation of the top three highest-paid top managers as there is no transparency requirement at the 
individual manager or director level. Our independent variables comprise state ownership (shares directly 
owned by the state, and the dummy variable indicating whether the ultimate controller of the firm is the 
state), firm performance (ROA, Tobin’s Q), macro-economic factors (the natural logarithm of the local 
province’s annual GDP, of the annual inward FDI, and of corporate employment18), board structure 
(independent director ratio, the existence of a compensation/strategy committee, CEO-chairman duality, top 
management team size, board size), political connections, managerial backgrounds (education, international 
experience) and ability (specialized experience). We control for industry, year, and province fixed effects. 
We cluster standard errors at the firm level to further adjust for correlation of unobserved characteristics 
across firms.  
Endogeneity is potentially an issue as there may be reverse causality between managerial pay and most 
firm-level variables. However, under China’s unique institutional arrangement, state ownership, managerial 
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 A correlation check indicates there is no multicollinearity problem between these variables. 
18
 As both the macro(-economic) variables and the dependent variables are in natural logarithms, the beta coefficient 
also measures the effects of change of these variables, since the first-order approximation of its Taylor serial is its 
growth rate.  
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backgrounds, board structures are mostly directly determined by the state, and can thus be viewed as 
exogenous rather than being affected by managerial compensation. Probably, the only potentially 
endogenous variables are those measuring firm performance: while managerial compensation can be 
determined by corporate performance, performance results from managerial effort and incentives which may 
hinge on compensation. Such endogeneity problems may be especially severe in a Western context where 
managers receive a significant amount of their total compensation in the form of stock options or restricted 
stock, and it’s hard to unbundle the short-term and long-term financial incentives (Datta et al., 2009). 
However, this is much less of a concern in the case of China because equity-based compensation is rare, and 
executive compensation packages are produced bureaucratically, with weak links to share price (Buck et al., 
2008). There has been no tradition of (marked-oriented) pay-for-performance for individual executives 
owing to the Chinese national culture with high collectivism and high power-distance tolerance. We still 
address this endogeneity issue by implementing an instrument variable approach as a robustness check on 
our results. 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
6.1. Benchmark results 
It is important not just to test the state-stewardship for the whole sample period but also to distinguish 
between the periods before and after the regulatory structural break of 2006 (the split-share reform) and 
study the economic transition patterns. To examine the impact of the state on top managerial compensation, 
we estimate the regression including the degree of state ownership (or whether the state is the ultimate 
shareholder) (for definitions, see Table 3). A first important observation is that state ownership has a 
significantly negative impact on managerial pay for the full sample (full sample in Table 5), but this relation 
only occurs for the pre-2006 period when a 1% increase in state ownership results in an average 0.225% 
decrease in the managerial pay, ceteris paribus. That entails that, for instance, a 30% higher percentage of 
state ownership drives down the managerial compensation by about 7%. This supports H1a in that managers 
in more state-oriented companies receive a lower pecuniary compensation, especially when the state control 
is strong (through direct ownership). This effect disappears from 2006 when the state significantly reduced 
its (non-tradable) share stakes and direct state control became weaker. Similar results are found when we 
replace the State direct ownership with State ultimate shareholder dummy as an explanatory variable. 
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An alternative explanation on the negative association between state ownership control and managerial 
pay may lie in the tradeoff between incentive and insurance: state ownership and the resulting state 
appointments insulate top executives from turnover. Therefore, SOE managers may be willing to accept 
lower compensation in exchange for higher job security. However, we find that managerial turnover is not 
significantly larger in private firms than in SOEs19. Moreover, the job security argument does not explain the 
statistical significance of the coefficients of Political Experience either: politically-connected managers are 
supposed to have more secure positions and would hence earn less if the above turnover argument were true.  
Jiang et al. (2010) suggest that high other receivables represent inter-company loans to firms of 
blockholders. As the use of this type of loans has been shown to enable tunneling, managers of firms with 
high other receivables are suspected of collude with blockholders, which are usually state agencies and 
politicians. In the context of these opportunities for self-dealing, managers may care less about their regular 
cash income. Other receivables are always significantly negative in Table 5 (for the full and pre-2006 
samples), which supports H1b and indicates that gray income and cash compensation are to some extent 
substitutes. The fact that the negative relation is not statistically significant in the more recent years implies 
that this type of tunneling by managers (along with dominant shareholders) is no longer (or less) prevalent 
and that the government crackdown on this type of self-dealing has been successful (and/or that other 
channels have been found for tunneling). These results are salient given that we have already controlled for 
ownership concentration which to some extent captures the agency argument that blockholders can ‘bribe’ 
managers. 
One concern about this result would be that the causality is likely to go in the opposite direction: 
managers are more likely to engage in gray income-generating behaviors because they have lower monetary 
compensation. If this were the case, we would expect the negative relation to be stronger in firms with more 
concentrated state ownership as the manager needs to compensate more for his low pay through gray income. 
In unreported regressions, we include an interaction term between state ownership and other receivables. 
However, its coefficients are not statistically significant, neither before nor after 2006, a finding which is 
also supported by our tests on subsamples of SOEs and private firms. 
We document a strong relation between firm performance and managerial compensation (Table 5). For 
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 To check this, we collected information on managerial turnover in the pre-2006 subsample, and generated a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if there was a change in managers in the year under consideration, and 0 otherwise. The average 
managerial change for SOEs is 24% while the average managerial change for private firms is 20%. 
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the full sample, the economic significance of the ROA coefficient (12.5% [2.3%×5.44]) is four times bigger 
than that of Tobin’s Q (3.15% [1.4%×2.25]) which implies that the accounting performance is in general 
more important than the market-based benchmark. A more detailed analysis reveals that ROA is only 
positively significant in the pre-2006 sample whereas both the accounting and market-based measures are 
significant for the post-2006 sample. This provides some support for H2 in that the managerial 
compensation depends on accounting returns, but only since 2006 also on the market-based return. This 
finding is conform with China’s move towards a more market-based economy.  
An alternative explanation may be under an optimal contracting framework. For example, Kang and 
Liu (2008) find that the sensitivity of managerial compensation with respect to stock performance is 
positively correlated with the measure of stock price informativeness. Before the 2006 split-share reform, 
most shares were held by the government and its affiliated agencies in China were non-tradable, and the 
stock market was not efficient which implies that stock prices were at best a coarse measure of underlying 
firm fundamentals. Therefore, the state linked managerial pay to some other measures such as ROA to 
capture managerial performance. After the 2006 reform, all the non-tradable shares were gradually floated 
on the stock market, thus increasing the stock market efficiency (Murillo et al., 2011). As a result, executive 
compensation could now also tied more closely to firm stock performance such as Tobin’s Q. However, this 
assumes that bonuses are paid out linked to stock price increases and the compensation contract is revised 
every year, which is not the case in China (Adithipyangkul et al., 2011). Furthermore, it has been 
empirically shown that stock price informativeness has actually decreased in China since the split-share 
reform, due to the risk-sharing induced by the broadened investor base which leads investors to collect less 
information on the firm’s future payoff20 (Chang et al., 2012; Li et al., 2011), which significantly weakens 
this explanation. 
Managers with political experience receive a higher compensation, and this relation between pay and 
the political background is stronger in the post-reform period. Managers with a political background 
received 4.5% more compensation prior to 2006, but this increased to 5% post 2006 (a difference which is 
statistically significantly different but economically small)21. This echoes – although only weakly – Xu’s 
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 Peress (2010) argues that enlarged investor base would reduce the risks born by each shareholder. In general, those 
investors will then be less incentivized to collect information on the firm’s future payoff. Since stock price 
informativeness reflects the aggregation of information gathered by each investor, there will be a decrease in stock 
price informativeness following the expansion of investor base. As stock splits merely increase the number of shares 
outstanding without raising extra capital, it leads to a smaller proportionate ownership size and stronger risk sharing 
effect. 
21
 We generate a dummy variable indicating whether the observation belongs to the post-2006 sample (or not), and an 
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(2011) claim about the government’s control over executive personnel: stronger political ties are reflected in 
higher executive compensation. These findings fail to reject H3a.  
Next, we relate the top managers’ ‘prestige’, which is captured by their international work experience, 
overseas education, educational level, and academic background, to their compensation. We find that 
international work experience is financially compensated (and even increasingly so), certainly for reasons of 
prestige in the home country, but possibly also because this type of experience may bring valuable expertise 
to the company. It should be noted that since Chinese firms turned more market-oriented, international 
exposure is rewarded more (Table 5) but top management’s specialized expertise in finance, accounting, or 
technology is not priced. We also observe that managers with a higher level of education, overseas education, 
or an academic (university) background receive higher pay. From a human capital view, specialized 
expertise, international experience, and education could all contribute to managers’ competence, but in 
China, only those factors with a strong connotation to prestige are priced in terms of higher managerial 
compensation. This result gives some support our H3b, and is reinforced by the Chinese culture in which 
prestige factors play a prominent role. The fact that managerial pay is strongly related to what are considered 
in China as prestige factors, but less to ability factors, implies that the Chinese compensation policy is 
somehow a window-dressing corporate governance practice aiming at cherry picking managers who are 
loyal to the state. We also control for age, which is strongly positively related to compensation, and gender 
which has a negative (but not statistically significant) impact.  
Regarding the internal corporate governance structure, we find that the larger the size of the board and 
of the management team (which is shown in Figure 2 not to be part of the board and has a low correlation 
with board size), the higher the pay of the top management. The proportion of independent directors does 
not have an impact on compensation implying that independent directors are not effective in regulating 
managerial pay. In addition, managerial pay is higher in firms with a compensation committee, but not with 
a strategy committee. The fact that independent director ratio and other board structures are irrelevant while 
compensation committee is positively related to pay supports H4a that they do not function to constrain 
managerial pay. Our results are also consistent with the findings in Markoczy et al. (2013) that firms set up 
compensation committees as a symbolic management tool to create the appearance of legitimacy by paying 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
interaction term between this dummy variable and the manager’s “political experience” variable. The F-test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of these variables are jointly zero, implying the coefficients of “political experience” 
in the pre-2006 and post-2006 samples are statistically significantly different (the effect of including the post-2006 
dummy in the regression is significant).  
  22
high managerial compensation. In unreported regressions, we create a variable interacting compensation 
committee dummy with ROA, and find that compensation committees weaken the pay-performance 
sensitivity. We find similar results for the independent director ratio, and for board structure variables when 
they are interacted with Tobin’s Q (the interaction term does not affect the significance of Tobin’s Q in 
isolation). In general, these findings suggest that the symbolic board structures do not reduce managerial pay 
and do not induce pay-for-performance. Furthermore, managerial duality does not significantly influence 
managerial compensation prior to 2006, but subsequently gained significance. The coefficient of the 
interaction term between managerial duality and political experience (not reported) is significant and 
positive for SOEs. This is consistent with our prediction in H4b: given the state’s reduction of control based 
on ownership concentration, it wants to appoint more (re)liable or trusted people whom they give more 
responsibilities and thus compensate better. 
One may be concerned that the above findings on board structures may be explained by the managerial 
power theory. That is, powerful managers can dominate the corporate governance mechanisms (such as the 
nomination of independent directors and board committees) which enable them to receive higher 
compensation and contracts with lower pay-for-performance. However, this argument is weakened by the 
fact that the coefficients of the independent director ratio are never statistically significant. In addition, the 
positive effect of the interaction between managerial duality and political experience (not reported) indicates 
that higher pay is based on managers’ political reliability rather than managerial power. Another concern 
about the positive effect of compensation committees may be that one of the roles of the compensation 
committee is to attract talented managers with higher pay (Markoczy et al., 2013). However, this argument is 
not supported by its weaker association with pay-for-performance, and the fact that the pay is not linked to 
managerial expertise in specialized fields. 
Interestingly, Table 5 shows that the coefficients of local GDP (Ln(GDP)) and inward foreign direct 
investment (Ln(inward FDI)), which measure the local provincial governors’ political goals and 
achievements, are significant but in different time periods22: the growth of inward FDI is significant 
pre-2006, whereas GDP growth only plays a role post-2006. This implies that the priority in local governors’ 
political goals has evolved over time: prior to 2006, attracting foreign investment to upgrade the industrial 
structures and obtain technological knowhow was a major political concern, but since 2006, the stronger 
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 As Ln(GDP) and Ln(Inward FDI) are highly correlated (over 80%), we do not include these variables in the same 
regression. 
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market-orientation and widespread financial crisis put more pressure on the state and local governors to 
boost economic growth so as to maintain legitimacy and political stability. Table 5 also reveals that the 
number of employees of the firm (Ln(Employees)), which proxies for both the level of responsibilities of top 
management and the firm’s contribution to local employment, is positively related to pay. Securing 
employment has gained importance over time, especially since the economic crisis struck. This supports H5: 
managerial compensation is tied to macroeconomic political goals and achievement indicators. 
We do not find the typical pay-performance relationship documented in some other papers, such as 
Conyon and He (2011), Chen et al. (2011), and Cao et al. (2011). One key distinction between our model 
and theirs is that we control for the political dimension such as state ownership, managers’ political 
connections, political achievement variables, etc. We argue that ignoring the strong state involvement could 
bias the empirical findings and reduce the ability to judge how Chinese managers are actually evaluated. 
Furthermore, given the large heterogeneity in industrial and regional development within China’s economy, 
what is missing in previous studies are industry and province fixed effects. 
[Table 5] 
6.2. State-owned enterprises versus private firms 
In the previous section, we have found that contrary to the predictions of agency theory, managerial 
compensation is negatively related to state ownership/control and other receivables, positively related to 
managers’ prestige factors and local governors’ political goals. Compensation is not related to shareholder 
value before 2006 (e.g. Tobin’s Q), managers’ past professional experience, and board structure (with 
exception of the compensation committee - which can be argued - could regarded as a ‘symbolic 
management’ tool). We expect that the impact of the above explanatory variables differ across firm type, 
and be stronger for SOEs. In this section, we analyze two subsamples: SOEs in which the proportion of 
state-owned shares amounts to more than 30% and ‘privately-owned’ firms with state ownership below that 
threshold. We expect that SOEs and private firms generally have different operating objectives and are 
subject to specific levels of political monitoring. It should be noted that the Chinese definition of a private 
firm is different from that in western economies: although the average ownership in a Chinese private firm 
stake can be low, the influence of the party (through the board, party representatives in the company, etc.) is 
still significant.  
Table 6 compares the results for SOEs and private firms for the full sample period and the two 
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sub-periods. For SOEs, the previous results supporting our state-stewardship hypotheses still hold for both 
types of SOE classifications: (1) State ownership is significantly negatively correlated with managerial pay 
for SOEs, while such effect is not significant in private firms (including the State Ultimate Shareholder 
variable in our regressions yields similar results; not shown). (2) As before, the tunneling effect through 
other receivables is significant in the pre-2006 sample but not in the post-2006 sample, and it is particularly 
strong for private firms. This strengthens our argument that managers collude with the dominant 
shareholders (see Jiang et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2012)) to extract private benefits especially in private (less 
state-owned) firms. (3) ROA still has a positive influence on managerial pay, whereas Tobin’s Q only has a 
significant impact after 2006. The increased focus on market-based performance is visible both for SOEs 
and for private firms, and the pay-to-market performance tie is stronger in private firms. (4) Prestige (such as 
international work experience and the level of education) translates into higher compensation, especially for 
SOEs, while specialized experience does not. (5) Managerial political background is more important for 
private firms (with less state ownership control) than for SOEs, which indicates a tradeoff between state 
ownership and managerial political connections between two types of firms. (6) Internal corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the proportion of independent director are still not statistically significant 
for SOEs, but are for private firms prior to 2006. The symbolic role of the compensation committee remains 
strong, and has become stronger for SOEs than for private firms after 2006. Managerial duality is significant 
and positive in private firms in which ownership control by the state is weaker, especially after 2006. The 
coefficient on the interaction term between managerial duality and political experience (unreported) is only 
significant in the private firm post-2006 subsample but neither for SOEs nor for pre-2006 samples. (7) 
Political goals (firm employment and provincial economic performance) variables still matter for managerial 
pay. In general, our perspective is still robust within SOE and private subsamples. 
[Table 6] 
6.3. The regional analysis 
One important characteristic of China is its geographic heterogeneity. Even though we have controlled 
for province fixed effects, an analysis by region is warranted. There are 31 provinces/regions in mainland 
China that they are grouped based on geographic and demographic characteristics (excluded are Hong Kong 
and Macau, and included are five ethnic minority autonomous regions: Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, 
Ningxia, Guangxi, and four municipalities: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). We group the 
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provinces into North China, South China, East China and West China23, and also analyze the regional North, 
Northwest, and Southwest24 separately given their lower level of industrialization and development.25  
Table 7 displays that the effects of state influence vary substantially across regions.26 For example, in 
East China which is the most economically developed and market-oriented region, the influence of state 
ownership is insignificant (model (1) in Table 7). The East China region consists of mostly coastal provinces 
which opened their ports to foreign trade already more than one century ago. In the West, North, or 
Northwest regions (models (3), (4), and (6)), state influence is much stronger than in the South (model (2)) 
or Southwest (model (7)), which can be explained by the fact that these regions were historically considered 
as strategically located. Most of the ancient imperial capitals were established in these regions (for example, 
Xi’an, the capital city of Shaanxi Province, was the capital for six imperial dynasties) and they are now the 
key places in which the state is implementing the pervasive ‘Western Development Strategy’ (in Chinese, 
Xibu Dakaifa Zhanlve). It is therefore not surprising that the tradition of state-influence remains most 
significant in these regions. Furthermore, a comparison between the minority autonomous region sample and 
the municipality sample shows that political connections, symbolic management (compensation committees), 
and political goals are more important in municipalities which are directly controlled by the state. These 
state-stewardship factors are less emphasized in autonomous regions. In addition, managerial pay is tied to 
market-based returns (Tobin’s Q) in autonomous regions but not in municipalities. It is also interesting to 
note that wherever the state ownership does not have a significant impact on managerial pay, the manager’s 
political background variable has a significant effect, which implies a potential tradeoff between state 
ownership and political connections. This confirms our argument that state-ownership and state-stewardship 
are substitutes for the state to maintain control over the firms. 
[Table 7] 
6.4. Robustness Checks 
                                                        
23
 Our regional partition of China’s provinces is slightly different from the conventional administrative division that 
classifies China into six regions. We distinguish between: (i) North China (including the North East and North but 
excluding Inner Mongolia): Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi. (ii) South China: Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Hainan. (iii) West China (including Southwest, Northwest, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi): Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi. (iv) East 
China: Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhengjiang, Anhui, Fujian, Shanghai. 
24
 Regional North includes the following municipalities and provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia; 
Northwest includes Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang; Southwest includes Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Tibet, and 
Chongqing. 
25
 For reasons of conciseness, we only report the results for the full sample by region. 
26
 In unreported regressions, we replace state ownership by state control and reach similar conclusions. 
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6.4.1 Results from alternative panel data models 
To test the robustness of our results, we conduct some more empirical tests with different specifications. 
Our afore-mentioned results are based on a random effect model controlling for year, industry, and province 
fixed effects. As alternative estimation methods, we use pooled OLS models (while controlling for year, 
industry and province), pure random effect models (without controlling for year, industry and province 
effects), and firm-fixed effect models. Obviously, the non-time-variant variables yield no results in a 
firm-fixed effects model. The first three models of Table 8 report that the coefficients on the state ownership 
variable are significantly negative and the coefficients on the politically-connected managers are 
significantly positive. Other receivables have a significant negative relationship with managerial pay. The 
pay for performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) is positively significant. The coefficients on independent 
directors are again not significant when we control for year, industry, and province fixed effects, but are 
significant when we use a pure random effects model. We argue that the insignificance of the results with 
fixed effects models make more sense: given the large heterogeneity among different industries and regions, 
we need to control for provincial and industrial variation by including their fixed effects. The same 
arguments apply to the sign and significance of internal governance variables – again, we find that only the 
coefficient on the compensation committee (a symbolic feature) is significant, while that on independent 
director ratio is not. The results of the managerial characteristics remain as before; prestige factors are 
positively and significantly influencing managerial pay whereas the variables capturing ability are not. 
6.4.2 Pay and performance revisited: an IV strategy 
Most studies deal with the pay-performance causation issue by including the one-year lagged value of 
profitability measures as independent variables. An alternative (and maybe more robust) approach is an 
instrumental variable (IV) strategy with a good instrument at the firm-, industry- or regional-level financial 
and economic factors (as they are most relevant to corporate performance) provided that this instrument does 
not directly influence managerial pay27. The Chinese unique social and cultural background gives us a 
plausible IV: the interlocking network of directors among Chinese firms. A key issue of Chinese business is 
the extensive use of personal connections (in Chinese, Guanxi) and network strategies (Ren et al., 2009). 
                                                        
27
 A valid IV should be correlated with the endogenous regressor (performance measure) but orthogonal to any other 
omitted characteristics (i.e., uncorrelated with the outcomes of interest through any channel other than their effect via 
the endogenous performance variable). However, one major difficulty is that likely candidates at the level of formal 
economic factors may be significantly affected by the state’s political influence, and may thus be correlated with 
managerial pay through those channels. Therefore, we turn to individual-level factors. 
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Such connections and networks are part of the informal institutions that also influence business activities and 
economic development (North 1990). Director interlocks are an important form of such network ties that can 
shape firm behavior and hence performance (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). Such a professional network may 
give access to information within the network (Davis 1991) and enables network members to handle 
uncertainties better (Shropshire, 2010, Shipilov et al., 2010). However, in the Chinese context, we expect 
interlocked director networks to have little direct impact on managerial compensation, because managers are 
not directors, usually do not own an equity stake (in contrast to the directors), and are usually appointed by 
the state (even in ‘private’ firms, the state has a large impact on top managerial appointments). Director 
networks in China are highly developed because of (past) informal and political connections (Ren et al., 
2009) but are not the result of current and past firm performance.  
A network based on director interlocks can be represented by the information centrality which 
measures the position of the firm within the network and is based on the ‘information’ contained in all 
possible geodesic paths between pairs of nodes (firms).28 We use this information centrality variable to run 
a 2SLS regression, controlling for the same variables and fixed effects as in the regressions explained in 
sections 6.1 to 6.329,30. The last two columns of Table 8 report the IV results from a 2SLS estimation, with 
information centrality of the director networks as an instrument variable for ROA31. The one but last column 
is the first-stage estimation with ROA as dependent variable, and information centrality along with all other 
key and control variables as independent variables. We find that information centrality is loading 
significantly on ROA. Academic experience and specialized expertise in technology lead to higher reported 
accounting returns whereas international work experience, overseas education, educational level do not. 
Expectedly, stronger state ownership and political experience do not yield a higher ROA. The last column is 
                                                        
28
 The centrality measurement method assumes that each link in a network path is independent, with the variance of a 
single link between nodes being unity. Therefore, the variance of a path is simply its length. This measure captures the 
communication in corporate interlocks that occurs along reachable, non-geodesic pathways (Stephenson and Zelen, 
1989: 3). We calculate this information centrality measure using software Ucinet 6 as in Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 
(2002). We then estimate the information centrality of a vertex i (firm i) as the harmonic mean of all the information 
measures between i and all other vertices in the network, and the information measure between two vertices i and j is 




where I refers to the centrality or information of (i), the harmonic average of the information associated with the path 
from (i) to the other nodes. 
29
 We do exclude a few variables which could serve as alternative channels for networks. We exclude the tunneling 
variable (because director network may affect managerial pay through the tunneling network), as well as size, capital 
intensity, and sales growth rate (which may all be influenced by information centrality and serve as alternative channels 
for information centrality to affect firm performance). Political experience is included in the model as it not related to 
our networks measure (the correlation is only -0.02). 
30
 Due to the data availability issue, we perform this IV exercise on the pre-2006 sample only. 
31
 We only instrument on ROA since we found that Tobin’s Q was not a key determinant for managerial pay before 
2006.  
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the second-stage estimation with managerial pay as dependent variable and the predicted ROA along with all 
other variables as independent variables. One can easily verify that the results remain similar as in previous 
estimations, and most key variables (state ownership, political experience, ROA, Ln(inward FDI), 
international prestige, education degree, compensation committee, etc.) are highly significant. Compensation 
is lower in state-controlled firms and higher when top managers have built up political experience. Only 
“prestige” is significantly and positively associated with managerial pay, and the existence of the 
compensation committee is positively related to higher compensation while the ratio of independent director 
is not. Political goals still play a role, as manifested by the significant coefficient on corporate employment. 
All of our five hypotheses are still receiving support in the IV estimations. In addition, the fact that the IV 
results are not significantly different from our basic results (of sections 6.1-6.3) implies that the endogeneity 
problem may not be that severe in our basic specifications32. 
[Table 8] 
In sum, the empirical evidence so far largely confirms our five sets of hypotheses developed under the 
state-stewardship framework. 
6.5. Generalizability and alternative explanations 
Is our state-stewardship view context-specific or can it be generalized to other emerging markets with 
strong political involvement in business? Essentially, to answer this question is to ask: whether political 
institutions (e.g., autocratic regime, state ownership and control, political connections under administrative 
rules, etc) are the key determinants of corporate governance outcomes, including executive compensation. 
One potential alternative explanation on the China’s executive compensation is related to the unique Chinese 
cultural and social norms. One can argue that the prevailing social norms in China prevent executives from 
being paid excessively more than other employees and paid for performance. However, it is empirically 
found that firms in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore which are also Chinese communities with similar 
cultural origin but different political regimes, have corporate governance structure and executive 
compensation schemes that are conform to the agency theory (Sun, Zhao, & Yang, 2010), rather than the 
institutional-based state-stewardship view. Meanwhile, in many transitional economies (under the Socialist 
legal origin), executive compensation is found to be not tied to profitability but rather to political connection 
and political goals (e.g., Jones & Kato, 1996; Eriksson, 2005). These conform that the executive 
                                                        
32
 The F-statistics against the null that the excluded instrument (information centrality) is irrelevant in the first-stage 
regression is larger than 10, which indicates that information centrality qualifies as a strong instrument variable. 
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compensation patterns in China and other emerging economies under strong state involvement are a direct 
result of political institutions and institutional change, rather than cultures and social norms. Such effects 
remain even after massive privatization in these economies. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a state-stewardship view (which competes with the agency perspective) to explain 
China’s state-manager relationship, as well as the corporate governance model and executive compensation 
schemes which are under the political influence of the state. As the world’s largest country transiting from a 
fully state-controlled economy to a more market-oriented one through partial privatizations of firms, China 
offers the right context to test this theory. We hypothesize that Chinese executives act as responsible 
stewards of the state and run their companies in such a way that the firm’s objectives are aligned with those 
of the state. Consequently, managers’ compensation schemes are set to reflect their loyalty to the state and 
abilities to fulfill both the political objectives and the economic targets (with the political aims dominating). 
Since the 2006 reforms, the state influence has transited from state control through ownership to 
state-stewardship. Our state-stewardship framework hinges on five testable hypotheses. We use firm-level 
micro data for almost all public non-financial listed firms for the period 2001 to 2011 as well as 
regional-level macro data to test our hypotheses at three levels: the personal level, the corporate level, and 
the macroeconomic level. Chinese managers are paid much less than their international counterparts. The 
lower is the compensation in China, the larger is the ownership stake held by the state (or the stronger is the 
ultimate control of the state). Such lower pay seems to be compensated by higher gray income through 
colluding on tunneling activities. Also, the management seems to be remunerated not for maximizing 
shareholder shareholders (proxied by Tobin’s Q) but that of the state-owned assets (proxied by ROA). In 
addition, compensation is not linked to ability or personality, but to political connections and prestige. 
Furthermore, internal governance mechanisms such as the percentage of independent directors and the 
compensation committee on the board are symbolic and do neither constrain managerial pay nor strengthen 
pay-for-performance. Moreover, CEO-chairman duality is used by the state to give more responsibilities to 
reliable state-stewards. Finally, managerial pay is closely tied to local officials’ political goals and 
achievements, even after controlling for provincial fixed effects. These effects are stronger in the pre-2006 
period because subsequent to the split-share reform, companies became more market-oriented.  
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Our empirical results lead to a critical evaluation of the relationships among the state, the firm, and the 
managers. Whereas most academic studies apply the western agency theory on China’s corporate 
governance model and executive compensation, we take a state-stewardship perspective and argue that the 
state is actually seized by and represents the interest of the ruling government and its politicians rather than 
its citizens, as argued by North’s (1990) predatory theory of the state and the seminal work by Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005). Note that our basic argument is that Chinese managers are the stewards of the state, but 
not necessarily of the nation – the private citizens. In this context, the motivation of the manager would be 
substantially different. The threat to political and social order calls for a hierarchical social structure, which 
distributes rents according to individuals’ social status and loyalty to the state. As China has been a 
communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on 
how companies are run. As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same 
interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands 
for the society at large or the collective private citizens). The state and its steward-managers form the same 
interest group and expropriate the private sector (and the citizens). The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged 
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 Figure 2. China’s corporate governance structure after privatizatio
Figure 2a illustrates a conceptual internal governance structure of a typical Chinese company since the 
privatization. The two-tier board structure (the board of directors and the supervisory board) is similar to the 
German model but the combination of e
similar to the US/UK model. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) usually assigns a Party committee to 
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Table 1. Comparing Principal-agent and State-Stewardship Perspectives 
 
 Principal-Agent Perspective State-stewardship Perspective 
Key Idea Owner-manager relationship should reflect the 
efficient organization of information and 
risk-bearing costs. 
Owner-manager relationship reflects a high degree of 
loyalty and effective interaction skills in order to reach 





 Bounded rationality; 
 Risk aversion. 
 Bounded rationality; 
 Mutual and voluntary acceptability of bargains; 
 Human ambivalence.  




 Owner and manager have conflicts of 1) 
goal alignment and 2) risk sharing 
 Multiple economic, social, and political goals 
could conflict;  
 Interdependence of these interests. 
Problem 
Issue 
 Information asymmetry between owner 
and manager; 
 Agency (moral hazard and adverse 
selection); 
 Risk sharing between owner and manager. 
 Company’s economic interests are in conflict with 
the government’s political and social interests and 
agenda. 
 State’s direct intervention could be in conflict with 
market-based principles and damage other 
shareholder’s interests.  
Solutions  Comprehensive contract formation;  
 Incentives compensation policy for 
managers. 
 Controlling agency costs 1) behavior & 2) 
outcome observations. 
 Two-way communication and influences under an 
administrative orders (e.g., political connections 
serve as a major channel); 
 Formal contracts are incomplete; social and 
psychological informal contracts are required; 
 Ex-post allocation of power is important (Such as 
turnover/promotion mechanisms); 
 Ownership and voting rights become state’s major 
tools of control after the split-share reform). 
Decision 
Making  
 An aggregative process between the 
interests of owners and agents; 
 Leadership involves the brokerage of 
coalitions among different interests 
 An integrating process among multiple interests of 
multiple stakeholders; 
 Leadership involves a trusteeship 
Organization 
Evolvement 
 Instantaneous response to owner/agent 
interests  






Table 2. From State-ownership to State-stewardship 
 
  
 Pre-2006 Post-2006 
State-manager 
relationship 
State ownership and control State-stewardship (focusing more on 
managers’ political connections) 
Governance model 
(organizing principle) 
Unification of ownership and control 
(large non-tradable government controlled 
share blocks); more political oriented 
“command” governance model  
Partial separation of ownership and control 




The state possessed all control rights (in 
some partially privatized SOEs, voting 
rights proportional to shareholdings) 
Voting rights proportional to shareholdings 
Dividend Policy 
No dividends. Most profit re-invested in 
focal SOEs. 
Proposal: at least 10% of profit paid to all 
shareholders (including state) as dividend. 
Method of state 
control 
Mainly control through government 
ownership (large number of non-tradable 
shares), regulations and the state’s ultimate 
control (voting rights). 
Mainly control through appointment of 
executive personnel and administrative 
orders. 
Incentive structure Fulfilling political, social, and economic 
objectives, political and social goals are 
dominating. 
Fulfilling political and economic objectives, 
economic ones growing in importance 
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Table 3  
Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variable:  
Ln(Compensation) The natural logarithm of the total compensation in cash of the top three highest-paid top 
managers. Source: CSMAR (unit: RMB) 
State Ownership and Control: 
State Direct Ownership The percentage of firm’s shares owned by the State. Source: WIND. 
State Ultimate 
Shareholder 
This dummy variable equals one if the ultimate controlling shareholder is the state or a 
government agency, and zero otherwise. The ultimate controlling shareholder is defined 
as the largest shareholder (in terms of the number of shares held), or the shareholder 
whose voting rights exceed those of the largest shareholder (who may be the largest in 
terms of cash flow rights), or the shareholder who holds more than 30% of cash flow and 
voting rights, or who can determine the nomination of more than half of the directors 
through exerting voting rights. The definition of ultimate controller is similar as in the 
papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) and Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang (2000). Source: CCER database and CSMAR. 
Self-dealing and Gray Income: 
Other Receivables Other receivables as on the balance sheet 
Firm Performance:  
ROA Annual return on assets. Source: WIND. 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Source: WIND. 
Managerial Expertise, Background and Education: 
Political Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager is or was an official in the central 
government, local government, or the military, and zero otherwise. Source: manually 
collected from managers’ CVs. 
International Work 
Experience 
This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked or is working in a foreign 
multinational firm, a foreign joint venture, an overseas subsidiary of a Chinese company, 
or has worked abroad (including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), and zero otherwise. 
Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Overseas Education This dummy variable equals one if the manager was educated or obtained a degree 
abroad, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Accounting Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked in an accounting firm or 
position before, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Financial Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked in the financial industry 
before, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Technology Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked in a technology-related firm 
or position before, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Academic Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked in academia as a university 
professor or researcher before, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from 
managers’ CVs. 
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Gender This dummy variable equals one if the manager is female, and zero if he is male. Source: 
manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Foreign Nationality The dummy variable equals one if the manager is non-Chinese, and zero if Chinese. 
Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Education Level The score ranges from 0 to 4: zero if his highest education level is below junior college; 
one in case of junior college; two in case of a bachelor degree; three if the manager has 
graduated with a master’s degree; and four if graduated with a doctoral degree. Source: 
manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Age The manager’s age in the year reported. Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Internal Corporate Governance: 
Independent Director 
Ratio 
This ratio is the number the independent directors divided by the total number of 
directors. Source: CSMAR. 
Board Size Total number of the company’s board members. Source: CSMAR. 
Management Team Size Total number of the company’s total management team members. Source: CSMAR. 
Compensation Committee This dummy variable equals one if the company has a compensation committee, and zero 
otherwise. Source: CSMAR. 
Strategy Committee This dummy variable equals one if the company has a strategy committee, and zero 
otherwise. Source: CSMAR. 
Managerial Duality This dummy variable equals one if the positions of the general manager (president) and 
chairman are held by the same person, and zero otherwise. Source: CSMAR. 
Director Interlocks Number of independent directors who are holding director positions in other listed firms 
in the year under consideration. Source: manually collected from independent directors’ 
CVs. 
Information Centrality A firm’s relative position (“closeness”) to the center of its directors’ social network 
(calculated based on the geodesic paths between any pair of firm-nodes – by means of 
Ucinet 6) 
Firm Employment and Provincial Economic Performance: 
Ln(Local GDP) The natural logarithm of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the province where the firm 
is headquartered. Source: NBS (unit: 10,000 million RMB) 
Ln(Inward FDI) The natural logarithm of the flow of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) of the local 
province where the firm is headquartered. Source: China Statistical Yearbook (unit: 
USD10,000) 
Ln(Employees) The natural logarithm of the total number of people employed by the firm. Source: WIND 
Control Variables: 
Leverage The ratio of the book value of total debts to the book value of total assets. Source: WIND 
Sales Growth Annual sales growth rate. Source: WIND 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of the total book assets value. Source: WIND 
Capital Intensity The ratio of capital expenditure to net sales. Source: WIND 






Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable:       
Managerial compensation (000 
RMB) 15,314 884 
600 1160 0 43300 
State Ownership:       
State direct ownership 15,544 24.56% 16.98% 25.79% 0% 100% 
State ultimate shareholder 14,650 0.64 1 0.48 0 1 
Self-dealing and Gray Income:       
Other receivables/Assets 15,356 3.60% 1.60% 4.68% 0.11% 17.63% 
Firm Performance:       
ROA 15,618 3.90 3.73 5.44 -9.61 14.24 
Tobin’s Q 15,519 2.17 1.89 2.25 0.92 9.21 
Managerial Expertise, Background and Education: 
Political experience 16,419 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
Overseas education 16,422 0.04 0 0.20 0 1 
International work experience 16,417 0.06 0 0.23 0 1 
Education level 16,292 2.36 2 0.90 0 4 
Academic experience 16,420 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 
Technology experience 16,421 0.43 0 0.49 0 1 
Accounting experience 16,421 0.12 0 0.32 0 1 
Financial experience 16,421 0.06 0 0.24 0 1 
Foreign nationality 16,424 0.01 0 0.10 0 1 
Age 16,353 46.43 46 6.89 21 75 
Gender 16,423 0.05 0 0.22 0 1 
Internal Corporate Governance:      
Independent director ratio 15,499 36.95% 33.33% 18.59% 0% 88.89% 
Compensation committee 14,183 0.66 1 0.47 0 1 
Strategy committee 14,187 0.51 1 0.50 0 1 
Managerial duality 15,508 0.15 0 0.36 0 1 
Board size 15,505 8.81 9 2.46 0 24 
Management team size 15,464 7.08 6 3.95 1 64 
Firm Employment and Provincial Economic Performance: 
Local GDP 15,021 13568.8 10552.06 11209.39 138.73 53004 
Inward FDI  16,132 7.51×105 5.85×105 7.23×105 0 4.01×106 
Employees 15,545 4205.03 1621 16959.4 1 5.53×105 
Control Variables:       
Sales growth rate 15,715 18.02% 14.92% 29.61% -34.51% 87.63% 
Capital intensity 15,782 0.21 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.10 
Firm size (Ln(Assets)) 15,642 21.35 21.21 1.24 10.84 28.66 
Leverage 16,666 0.63 0.49 7.12 0 877.26 
Ownership concentration 15,329 0.55 0.56 0.14 0.29 0.78 
* All monetary terms are in RMB. 
** Other receivable/assets, ROA, Tobin’s Q, sales growth rate, capital intensity, ownership concentration are winsorized at 5% 
level. 
*** A correlation check suggests there is no multicollinearity between the explanatory and control variables.
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Table 5. 
Tests for the State-Stewardship View on Managers 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top 3 highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent variables are state ownership (%), a state ultimate shareholder 
dummy, ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), Tobin’s Q (winsorized at the 95% level), independent director ratio , board size, management team size, compensation 
committee dummy, strategy committee dummy, managerial duality dummy (equals 1 if the manager and chairman is the same person), logarithm of local province’s GDP and 
inward FDI, and of the total number of employees of the firm, a series of managerial background dummies, and control variables (leverage, sales growth rate, capital intensity, 
firm size (total asset value), and the ownership concentration of the top 5 blockholders. More information on variable definitions can be found in Table 3. *, **, and *** stand 
for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. GLS estimations are used. 
 Full sample Pre-2006 period Post-2006 period 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
State Ownership: 
State direct ownership -0.091** (0.029)   -0.225*** (0.057)   0.004 (0.034)   
State ultimate shareholder   -0.013 (0.017)   -0.061** (0.028)   0.014 (0.021) 
Self-dealing and Gray Income: 
Ln(Other Receivables) -0.011** (0.005) -0.010** (0.005) -0.020** (0.008) -0.019** (0.008) -0.001 (0.005) -0.000 (0.006) 
Firm Performance:             
ROA  0.023*** (0.001) 0.023*** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.002) 0.021*** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.001) 0.020*** (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q  0.015*** (0.003) 0.014*** (0.003) 0.004 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.001) 
Managerial Expertise, Background and Education: 
Political experience  0.041*** (0.015) 0.038** (0.015) 0.045* (0.026) 0.046* (0.026) 0.049** (0.022) 0.047** (0.022) 
Overseas education 0.057* (0.031) 0.041 (0.032) 0.091 (0.059) 0.075 (0.059) 0.074* (0.041) 0.050 (0.043) 
International work experience 0.116*** (0.027) 0.112*** (0.027) 0.091** (0.044) 0.077* (0.044) 0.154*** (0.042) 0.147*** (0.043) 
Education level 0.028*** (0.007) 0.028*** (0.007) 0.024* (0.013) 0.025* (0.013) 0.023** (0.010) 0.024** (0.010) 
Academic experience 0.025 (0.019) 0.021 (0.019) 0.080** (0.034) 0.073** (0.034) 0.016 (0.028) 0.017 (0.029) 
Technology experience 0.031** (0.013) 0.030** (0.013) 0.036 (0.024) 0.036 (0.024) -0.007 (0.018) -0.011 (0.019) 
Accounting experience -0.008 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) -0.022 (0.027) -0.020 (0.027) 0.029 (0.034) 0.016 (0.035) 
Financial experience -0.037 (0.025) -0.032 (0.025) -0.034 (0.048) -0.033 (0.048) -0.063* (0.035) -0.059* (0.035) 
Foreign nationality 0.231*** (0.072) 0.258*** (0.073) 0.139 (0.144) 0.156 (0.144) 0.154* (0.091) 0.208** (0.094) 
Age 0.005*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 
Gender -0.031 (0.028) -0.040 (0.029) -0.086 (0.055) -0.091* (0.055) -0.029 (0.037) -0.037 (0.037) 
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Table 5. (continued) 
Tests for the State-Stewardship View on Managers 
 Full sample Pre-2006 period Post-2006 period 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Internal Corporate Governance: 
Independent director ratio 0.020 (0.036) 0.011 (0.037) 0.050 (0.112) 0.048 (0.112) -0.008 (0.039) -0.019 (0.040) 
Board size 0.012*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.019*** (0.005) 
Management team size 0.013*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.044*** (0.005) 0.043*** (0.005) 0.019*** (0.002) 0.018*** (0.002) 
Compensation committee 0.076*** (0.016) 0.078*** (0.017) 0.089*** (0.027) 0.088*** (0.027) 0.051** (0.023) 0.055** (0.024) 
Strategy committee 0.005 (0.014) 0.003 (0.014) 0.015 (0.029) 0.024 (0.029) 0.001 (0.016) -0.003 (0.016) 
Managerial duality 0.041** (0.017) 0.042** (0.017) 0.039 (0.032) 0.038 (0.032) 0.040** (0.020) 0.039* (0.021) 
Firm Employment and Provincial Economic Performance: 
Ln(Local GDP) -0.028 (0.032)   0.048 (0.109)   0.121*** (0.043)   
Ln(Employees) 0.017** (0.008) 0.018** (0.008) -0.035*** (0.013) -0.036*** (0.013) 0.039*** (0.009) 0.041*** (0.009) 
Ln(Inward FDI)   0.038*** (0.013)   0.050** (0.026)   0.020 (0.020) 
Control Variables: 
Leverage 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.053* (0.030) -0.055* (0.030) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Sales growth rate -0.009 (0.017) -0.007 (0.017) -0.017 (0.026) -0.019 (0.026) -0.006 (0.019) -0.007 (0.020) 
Capital intensity -0.029 (0.027) -0.030 (0.020) -0.105*** (0.033) -0.105*** (0.033) -0.001 (0.036) -0.003 (0.037) 
Firm Size  0.241*** (0.010) 0.238*** (0.010) 0.287*** (0.021) 0.281*** (0.021) 0.194*** (0.012) 0.193*** (0.012) 
Ownership concentration 0.107* (0.059) 0.077 (0.059) 0.243* (0.136) 0.072 (0.125) 0.040 (0.069) 0.030 (0.069) 
Constant 6.565*** (0.339) 6.416*** (0.256) 6.232*** (1.065) 6.227*** (0.530) 6.814*** (0.474) 7.755*** (0.352) 
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Province fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations 12401  12042  4916  4886  7485  7156  
R-squared adjusted 53%  54%  41%  40%  44%  45%  
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Table 6. SOEs versus Private Firms  
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top 3 highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent variables are state ownership (%), ROA (winsorized at the 95% 
level), Tobin’s Q (winsorized at the 95% level) , independent director ratio , board size, management team size, compensation committee dummy, strategy committee dummy, 
managerial duality dummy (equals 1 if the manager and chairman is the same person), logarithm of local province’s GDP and inward FDI, and of total number of employees 
of the firm, a series of managerial background dummies, and control variables (leverage, sales growth rate, capital intensity, firm size (total asset value), and the ownership 
concentration of the top 5 blockholders. More information on variable definitions can be found in Table 3. *, **, and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. GLS estimations are used. 
 Full sample Pre-2006 sample Post-2006 sample 



























State direct ownership -0.268*** (0.101) 0.054 (0.093) -0.724*** (0.173) 0.226 (0.221) -0.323*** (0.128) 0.088* (0.103) 
Self-dealing and Gray Income: 
Ln(Other Receivables) -0.006 (0.007) -0.015** (0.006) -0.009 (0.010) -0.033** (0.014) 0.011 (0.010) -0.006 (0.007) 
Firm Performance: 
ROA 0.026*** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.001) 0.026*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.023*** (0.002) 0.019*** (0.002) 
Tobin’s Q 0.014*** (0.005) 0.009** (0.004) -0.001 (0.013) -0.001 (0.012) 0.010* (0.006) 0.012*** (0.004) 
Managerial Expertise, Background and Education: 
Political experience 0.018 (0.023) 0.039* (0.021) 0.007 (0.034) 0.073* (0.043) 0.042 (0.041) 0.045* (0.026) 
Overseas education 0.109** (0.050) 0.039 (0.042) 0.078 (0.076) 0.055 (0.091) 0.151** (0.075) 0.071 (0.049) 
International work exper. 0.101** (0.043) 0.097*** (0.035) 0.121** (0.058) 0.026 (0.070) 0.250*** (0.088) 0.095** (0.047) 
Education level 0.024** (0.011) 0.015 (0.010) 0.015 (0.016) 0.001 (0.021) 0.013 (0.018) 0.034*** (0.011) 
Academic experience 0.036 (0.027) 0.040 (0.027) 0.073* (0.042) 0.119** (0.056) -0.003 (0.051) 0.010 (0.033) 
Technology experience 0.005 (0.019) 0.050*** (0.018) 0.019 (0.029) 0.027 (0.040) -0.065** (0.030) 0.035 (0.022) 
Accounting experience -0.013 (0.024) -0.006 (0.025) -0.017 (0.034) -0.032 (0.043) 0.022 (0.059) 0.029 (0.041) 
Financial experience -0.070* (0.042) -0.024 (0.032) 0.019 (0.069) -0.077 (0.067) -0.030 (0.068) -0.045 (0.040) 
Foreign nationality 0.254 (0.211) 0.237*** (0.081) -0.128 (0.383) 0.259 (0.168) 0.655** (0.323) 0.133 (0.097) 
Age 0.000 (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002) 
Gender -0.030 (0.048) -0.033 (0.036) -0.106 (0.074) -0.037 (0.079) 0.058 (0.081) -0.054 (0.042) 
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Table 6 (continued). SOEs versus Private Firms 
 


























Internal Corporate Governance: 
Independent director ratio -0.129** (0.064) 0.076 (0.047) -0.146 (0.131) 0.304 (0.200) -0.031 (0.077) 0.019 (0.048) 
Board size 0.003 (0.004) 0.015*** (0.005) -0.002 (0.006) 0.008 (0.009) 0.013* (0.007) 0.021*** (0.006) 
Management team size 0.016*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.002) 0.039*** (0.006) 0.048*** (0.008) 0.014*** (0.004) 0.018*** (0.003) 
Compensation committee 0.079*** (0.023) 0.054** (0.024) 0.059* (0.032) 0.117*** (0.046) 0.071* (0.038) 0.022 (0.029) 
Strategy committee 0.021 (0.022) 0.000 (0.019) 0.020 (0.035) 0.025 (0.050) -0.008 (0.029) -0.002 (0.019) 
Managerial duality 0.012 (0.029) 0.064*** (0.022) 0.021 (0.042) 0.057 (0.049) -0.037 (0.041) 0.067*** (0.024) 
Firm Employment and Provincial Economic Performance: 
Ln(Local GDP)         0.156** (0.069) 0.100** (0.049) 
Ln(Employee) -0.007 (0.012) 0.033*** (0.010) -0.034* (0.017) -0.018 (0.021) 0.029** (0.015) 0.039*** (0.011) 
Ln(Inward FDI) 0.014 (0.019) 0.038* (0.020) -0.001 (0.029) 0.143*** (0.049)     
Control Variables: 
Leverage -0.020** (0.008) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.106** (0.050) -0.016 (0.039) -0.012 (0.010) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Sales growth rate -0.015 (0.025) -0.013 (0.022) -0.034 (0.033) -0.026 (0.041) 0.024 (0.034) -0.007 (0.024) 
Capital intensity -0.109*** (0.030) 0.029 (0.029) -0.149*** (0.043) -0.068 (0.051) -0.073 (0.064) 0.011 (0.046) 
Firm Size  0.235*** (0.016) 0.244*** (0.013) 0.251*** (0.026) 0.329*** (0.035) 0.183*** (0.019) 0.210*** (0.014) 
Ownership concentration 0.379*** (0.126) 0.005 (0.072) 0.878*** (0.221) 0.083 (0.196) 0.224** (0.151) -0.028 (0.081) 
Constant 7.335*** (0.387) 6.350*** (0.365) 7.382*** (0.637) 4.076*** (0.951) 7.298*** (0.752) 6.700*** (0.543) 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Province FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of obs. 5207  6825  2993  1895  2294  5191  
R-squared adj. 59%  50%  46%  38%  51%  44%  
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Table 7. Regional subsamples (2001-2011) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top 3 highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent variables are state ownership (%), ROA (winsorized at the 95% 
level), Tobin’s Q (winsorized at the 95% level) , independent director ratio , board size, management team size, compensation committee dummy, strategy committee dummy, 
managerial duality dummy (equals 1 if the manager and chairman is the same person), logarithm of local province’s GDP and inward FDI, and of total number of employees 
of the firm, a series of managerial background dummies, and control variables (leverage, sales growth rate, capital intensity, firm size (total asset value), and the ownership 
concentration of the top 5 blockholders. More information on variable definitions can be found in Table 3. *, **, and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level but not reported so as to save space. GLS estimations are used. 
 (1) East (2) South (3) West (4) North   (5) Regional North (6) Northwest (7) Southwest  (8) Auto-region (9) Municipality 
State Ownership:   
State direct ownership -0.078  (0.049) 0.281*** (0.091) -0.124* (0.069) -0.110* (0.059)  -0.090 (0.070) -0.311*** (0.121) 0.002 (0.091)  -0.093 (0.137) -0.040 (0.053) 
Self-dealing and Gray Income:   
Ln(Other Receivables) -0.008  (0.049) 0.014 (0.014) -0.015 (0.011) -0.022** (0.010)  -0.022* (0.012) -0.037* (0.019) -0.006 (0.015)  -0.016 (0.023) -0.007 (0.009) 
Firm Performance:   
ROA (winsorized) 0.024***  (0.002) 0.020*** (0.003) 0.026*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.003)  0.020*** (0.003) 0.028*** (0.004) 0.020*** (0.003)  0.027*** (0.005) 0.017*** (0.002) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.022** (0.009) 0.019*** (0.006) 0.002 (0.007)  0.011 (0.008) -0.004 (0.740) 0.030*** (0.008)  0.036*** (0.013) 0.005 (0.006) 
Managerial Expertise, Background and Education:   
Political experience 0.051**  (0.025) -0.012 (0.041) 0.069* (0.036) 0.035 (0.036)  0.093** (0.044) 0.075 (0.067) 0.078* (0.047)  -0.008 (0.067) 0.099*** (0.033) 
Overseas education 0.009 (0.051) 0.104 (0.092) 0.149* (0.088) 0.071 (0.066)  0.092 (0.082) 0.264 (0.175) 0.120 (0.106)  -0.171 (0.321) 0.083 (0.053) 
International work exper. 0.083** (0.042) 0.194*** (0.066) 0.031 (0.074) 0.050 (0.060)  0.002 (0.066) 0.171 (0.196) 0.016 (0.086)  0.043 (0.166) 0.060 (0.043) 
Education level 0.032*** (0.012) -0.018 (0.023) 0.017 (0.016) 0.049*** (0.017)  0.045** (0.021) 0.066** (0.030) -0.006 (0.021)  0.070** (0.032) 0.001 (0.015) 
Academic experience 0.021 (0.032) 0.032 (0.050) -0.016 (0.047) 0.025 (0.040)  0.019 (0.046) -0.101 (0.096) 0.047 (0.057)  -0.105 (0.103) 0.078** (0.034) 
Technology experience 0.043**  (0.021) -0.036 (0.038) 0.110*** (0.030) 0.056* (0.029)  0.051 (0.035) 0.065 (0.054) 0.082** (0.040)  0.156*** (0.058) 0.076*** (0.027) 
Accounting experience -0.032 (0.027) 0.072 (0.051) 0.006 (0.041) 0.036 (0.037)  0.045 (0.044) 0.032 (0.072) -0.063 (0.054)  0.138* (0.084) 0.049 (0.030) 
Financial experience -0.090** (0.044) 0.081 (0.064) -0.194*** (0.059) 0.071 (0.054)  0.004 (0.067) -0.301*** (0.105) -0.171** (0.081)  -0.203* (0.109) 0.066 (0.045) 
Foreign nationality 0.360*** (0.091) -0.267 (0.241) 0.347 (0.303) 0.503*** (0.170)  0.721** (0.365) -0.157 (0.371) 1.036** (0.499)  0.116 (0.418) 0.619*** (0.130) 
Age 0.006*** (0.001) 0.003 (0.003) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002)  0.012*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.004) 0.006** (0.003)  0.010** (0.005) 0.005** (0.002) 
Gender -0.035 (0.041) -0.127* (0.076) 0.060 (0.069) -0.019 (0.074)  -0.143 (0.099) -0.059 (0.108) 0.144 (0.104)  0.087 (0.115) -0.065 (0.056) 
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Table 7 (Continued). Regional subsamples (2001-2011) 
 (1) East (2) South (3) West (4) North China  (5) Regional North (6) Northwest (7) Southwest  (8) Auto-region (9) Municipality 
Internal Corporate Governance:   
Independent director ratio 0.058 (0.082) 0.065 (0.079) 0.059 (0.075) -0.105 (0.085)  -0.073 (0.113) -0.130 (0.183) 0.139 (0.085)  0.109 (0.216) -0.150 (0.096) 
Board size 0.012** (0.005) 0.042*** (0.009) 0.011 (0.007) -0.003 (0.007)  -0.009 (0.008) -0.001 (0.012) 0.021** (0.009)  0.010 (0.015) 0.000 (0.006) 
Management team size 0.013*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.004) 0.017*** (0.004) 0.008** (0.004)  0.004 (0.005) 0.017** (0.007) 0.013*** (0.005)  0.027*** (0.007) 0.004 (0.004) 
Compensation committee 0.068*** (0.026) 0.032 (0.051) 0.136*** (0.040) 0.039 (0.037)  0.007 (0.045) 0.171** (0.069) 0.144*** (0.054)  0.065 (0.072) 0.124*** (0.032) 
Strategy committee 0.032 (0.022) -0.020 (0.042) -0.119*** (0.035) 0.082*** (0.031)  0.087** (0.038) -0.103* (0.058) -0.129*** (0.049)  -0.084 (0.062) 0.008 (0.027) 
Managerial duality 0.054** (0.027) 0.044 (0.047) 0.037 (0.041) -0.008 (0.038)  -0.020 (0.052) 0.035 (0.082) 0.078 (0.053)  0.007 (0.078) 0.091** (0.036) 
Firm Employment and Provincial Economic Performance:   
Ln(Local GDP)   0.131*** (0.131) 0.020 (0.030)       -0.049 (0.043)    0.191*** (0.054) 
Ln(Employee) 0.020 (0.013) 0.073*** (0.020) -0.016 (0.017) -0.008 (0.017)  -0.001 (0.020) -0.080*** (0.031) -0.020 (0.023)  0.004 (0.036) 0.001 (0.013) 
Ln(Inward FDI) 0.035 (0.021)    0.158*** (0.026)  0.138*** (0.031) -0.059 (0.036)    0.022 (0.032)   
Control Variables:   
Leverage 0.004 (0.008) -0.004 (0.009) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.147*** (0.042)  -0.059 (0.046) -0.063 (0.095) 0.002*** (0.001)  -0.112 (0.116) 0.009 (0.008) 
Sales growth rate -0.056** (0.027) -0.057 (0.047) 0.003 (0.037) 0.073** (0.036)  0.026 (0.044) -0.002 (0.062) -0.000 (0.050)  -0.013 (0.066) 0.019 (0.031) 
Capital intensity -0.032 (0.036) 0.044 (0.058) -0.122*** (0.043) -0.066 (0.042)  -0.083 (0.054) -0.072 (0.074) -0.170*** (0.058)  -0.127 (0.081) -0.090** (0.040) 
Firm Size  0.211*** (0.018) 0.211*** (0.029) 0.275*** (0.024) 0.251*** (0.021)  0.250*** (0.025) 0.323*** (0.042) 0.294*** (0.032)  0.206*** (0.047) 0.227*** (0.019) 
Ownership concentration 0.088 (0.098) 0.090 (0.157) 0.044 (0.148) 0.308** (0.140)  0.266 (0.176) 0.641** (0.265) -0.125 (0.199)  -0.119 (0.279) 0.216* (0.129) 
Constant 6.453*** (0.430) 5.584*** (0.634) 5.602*** (0.475) 4.855*** (0.495)  4.892*** (0.582) 6.201*** (0.821) 5.996*** (0.659)  6.688*** (0.873) 5.626*** (0.537) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of observations 4289 1810 2384 2340  1591 800 1220  770 2376 
R-squared adj. 48% 50% 48% 57%  59% 58% 53%  49% 58% 
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Table 8. Other Robustness Checks  
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top 3 highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent variables are state ownership (%), a state ultimate shareholder 
dummy, ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), Tobin's Q (winsorized at the 95% level) , Independent director ratio , board size, management team size, compensation 
committee dummy, strategy committee dummy, managerial duality dummy (equals 1 if the manager and chairman is the same person), logarithm of local province’s GDP and 
inward FDI, and of total number of employees of the firm, a series of managerial background dummies, and control variables (leverage, sales growth rate, capital intensity, 
firm size (total asset value), and the ownership concentration of the top 5 blockholders. More information on variable definitions can be found in Table 3. *, **, and *** stand 
for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are robust or clustered at the firm level (for panel data estimations) and reported in parentheses. The 
standard errors for the second stage of 2SLS estimation are after adjustment. GLS estimations are used for all specifications. 
 Pooled OLS (2001-2011) Random Effects (2001-2011) Firm fixed effects (2001-2011) IV result (2SLS) 2001-2005 
 Coeff Std. Err.  Coeff Std. Err.  Coeff Std. Err.  1st stage (ROA) 2nd stage (Compensation) 
State Ownership: 
      
  
State direct ownership -0.129*** (0.030) -0.204*** (0.029) -0.083* (0.047) -1.102 (0.741) -0.170*** (0.059) 
Self-dealing and Gray Income: 
Ln(Other Receivables) 0.007 (0.005) -0.019*** (0.005) -0.015** (0.007) 
    
Firm Performance: 
ROA (winsorized) 0.036*** (0.001) 0.024*** (0.001) 0.019*** (0.002) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.088*** (0.017) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 0.016*** (0.004) 0.022*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.004) (Information centrality)  
Managerial Expertise, Background and Education: 
Political experience 0.029* (0.016) 0.033** (0.016) 0.047** (0.024) -0.017 (0.376) 0.049* (0.026) 
Overseas education 0.087** (0.034) 0.070** (0.033) 0.030 (0.054) 0.834 (0.877) -0.048 (0.060) 
International work experience 0.122*** (0.025) 0.148*** (0.028) 0.109*** (0.038) -0.760 (0.670) 0.180*** (0.046) 
Education level 0.048*** (0.007) 0.057*** (0.008) 0.018 (0.012) -0.112 (0.183) 0.024* (0.013) 
Academic experience 0.045** (0.020) 0.015 (0.020) 0.018 (0.028) 1.110** (0.478) 0.002 (0.039) 
Technology experience 0.020 (0.013) 0.017 (0.014) 0.023 (0.021) 0.717** (0.336) -0.020 (0.027) 
Accounting experience 0.012 (0.019) -0.046*** (0.018) -0.014 (0.027) -0.023 (0.388) 0.008 (0.027) 
Financial experience -0.036 (0.029) 0.003 (0.026) -0.033 (0.039) 0.649 (0.749) -0.048 (0.049) 
Foreign nationality 0.273*** (0.067) 0.206*** (0.076) 0.253** (0.104) 2.306 (2.152) 0.083 (0.154) 
Age 0.006*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.004** (0.001) 0.014 (0.024) -0.002 (0.002) 
Gender -0.081*** (0.027) -0.029 (0.030) -0.023 (0.043) 1.234 (0.759) -0.169*** (0.056) 
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Table 8 (Continued). Other robustness checks 
 Pooled OLS (2001-2011) Random Effect (2001-2011) Firm fixed effect (2001-2011) IV result (2SLS) 2001-2005 
 Coeff Std. Err.  Coeff Std. Err.  Coeff Std. Err.  1st stage (ROA) 2nd stage (Compensation) 
Internal Corporate Governance: 
Independent director ratio -0.019 (0.045) 0.284*** (0.034) 0.021 (0.058) 3.451* (1.932) -0.133 (0.124) 
Board size 0.023*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.006 (0.005) 0.024 (0.066) 0.036*** (0.004) 
Management team size 0.019*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.003) -0.178* (0.099) 0.006 (0.005) 
Compensation committee 0.095*** (0.020) 0.196*** (0.016) 0.069*** (0.023) -0.242 (0.385) 0.111*** (0.027) 
Strategy committee 0.024 (0.016) 0.056*** (0.014) 0.000 (0.019) 0.045 (0.420) 0.022 (0.029) 
Managerial duality 0.028 (0.019) 0.053*** (0.018) 0.045* (0.027) -0.043 (0.487) 0.032 (0.031) 
Firm Employment and Provincial Economic Performance: 
Ln(Local GDP)   0.305*** (0.012)   
    
Ln(Employee) -0.008 (0.007) -0.015** (0.008) 0.028* (0.015) 0.741*** (0.142) -0.013 (0.018) 
Ln(Inward FDI) 0.042** (0.018)   0.033* (0.020) -0.655 (0.495) 0.113*** (0.027) 
Control Variables: 
Leverage 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.000) -5.090*** (0.192) 0.333*** (0.091) 
Sales growth rate 0.002 (0.023) -0.002 (0.017) -0.007 (0.019) 
    
Capital intensity -0.100*** (0.023) -0.096*** (0.020) -0.004 (0.029) 
    
Firm Size  0.252*** (0.009) 0.306*** (0.010) 0.211*** (0.021) 
    
Ownership concentration -0.116*** (0.050) -0.149** (0.060) 0.339*** (0.118) 8.433*** (1.499) -0.189 (0.199) 
Constant 5.888*** (0.281) 3.326*** (0.185) 6.958*** (0.438) 2.305 (7.132) 10.733*** (0.381) 
Year fixed effect Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes No No Yes Yes 
Province fixed effect Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect No No Yes No No 
No. of observations 12032 12401 12032 5776 5564 
R-squared adj. 55% 43% 43% 20% 33% 
 
